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GRAND ANSE DECLARATION: CAN THE CARIBBEAN
COMMUNITY REALISTICALLY INTEGRATE
INTRAREGIONAL TRADE AND PRODUCTION WITHIN THE
CONFINES OF THE CARICOM TREATY BY 1993?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an international or-
ganization comprised of thirteen nations' having among several goals 2
the economic integration of the Caribbean Basin.' The Basin consists
of eleven small island nations and the two mainland nations of Belize
and Guyana,4 all sharing a common British heritage.' Economic co-
operation within the Basin, however, is frustrated by population
diversification 6 and geographical dispersion throughout "vast expanses
of sea." 7
1 Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S.
17, art. 2 [hereinafter CARICOM Treaty]. Membership includes Antigua, Barbados,
Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, (British) Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago.
2 See CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. These additional goals are the
coordination of foreign policies and the advancement of social, cultural, and tech-
nological development.
I See CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4. CARICOM created the Common
Market as the arm to implement the economic objectives of the Treaty. See Annex
to Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 28,
art. 3 [hereinafter Treaty Annex]. Bahamas is the only member of the Community
not a member of the Common Market. Id. at art. 2; Benn, The Caribbean Com-
munity: The Internal Environment, the Geographical, Economic and Political Legacy,
in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 27 n.l (1984). Bahamas does have observer status in
the Common Market Council. Caribbean Community Press Release, Feb. 14, 1987,
at 1.
. See James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1,
1989, at 8, col. 1.
I See generally Laing, Independence and Islands: The Decolonization of the
British Caribbean, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281 (1979); Integration and
Independence: The Development and Role of Sub-regional Organizations in Fostering
Effective Sovereignty in the Eastern Caribbean, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1987)
[hereinafter Integration and Independence].
6 See Kurlansky, Spirit of Unity Sweeping Caribbean Nations Move to Establish
a Single Market, Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1989, at 3, col. 3. Montserrat, for
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Seeking to establish economies of scale,8 area nations created CARI-
COM in 1973. 9 Members envisioned free intraregional trade and
intraregional economic integration'l as a means of establishing a
viable, competitive economic entity.1
A. The Grand Anse Declaration
In the most recent development in the Caribbean Community, the
leaders of twelve nations issued an ambitious declaration at the Gren-
ada Heads of Government Summit during July, 1989.12 In a thirteen
point agreement, CARICOM leaders endorsed a concrete program
to integrate their national economies into a single market by 1993.1
Agreement to establish a bona fide common market by 1993 rep-
resents a culmination of the efforts of Caribbean nations begun in
the 1973 Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community. 4 CARICOM
members contemplated establishing an integrated market in the Car-
ibbean basin in 1973,1 but realization of this goal thus far has
example, has a population of 11,000 people while Jamaica has more than two million
inhabitants. Id.
I See Benn, The Caribbean Community: The Internal Environment, the Geo-
graphical, Economic and Political Legacy, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 27, 28
(1984).
1 James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989,
at 8, col. 1. The Prime Minister of St. Kitts-Nevis illustrates both the advantage
and disadvantage of economies of scale:
A Jamaican brewery starting with the advantage of a large home market
and seeking to enter the St. Kitts-Nevis beer market, would have to make
only a minor adjustment to its output. On the other hand, a brewery in
St. Kitts-Nevis would probably have to exhaust the entire water supply... to
make even a marginal impression on the Jamaican market.
9 CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, Preamble.
10 Production integration is the coordination of regional capital and labor re-
sources to provide for efficient production of goods and services. See Blake, Pro-
duction Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CARICOM, in TEN YEARS
OF CARICOM 118, 119 (1984).
Cf. CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4.
z Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the
Integration Movement, July 8, 1989 [hereinafter Grand Anse Declaration]. Caribbean
Community Press Release, July 8, 1989, at 1 (commenting on and reprinting the
text of the Declaration). Bahamas indicated categorically that it was not interested
in the formation of a common market. James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin.
Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
11 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12. CARICOM members set different
time objectives for implementation of each of the 13 common market measures.
The members, however, assigned 1993 to be the absolute deadline for completion
of each measure.
'4 See CARICOM Treaty, supra note I.
11 Id. See also infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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remained elusive. 16 The creation of a single European market in 1992
and concern over the future of preferential trade arrangements with
the United States and the EEC, however, accelerated the pace toward
realization of the Common Market objective. 17
The Grand Anse Declaration establishes several interrelated pro-
cedures designed to implement a common market by 1993. The meas-
ures prescribed in the Declaration may readily be described as directed
toward either free intraregional trade or regional economic integra-
tion.
With respect to free trade, members to the agreement seek to
eliminate barriers to intraregional trade, 8 completing a program of
deregulation begun in October of 1988. The program will abolish
existing qualitative and quantitative trade restrictions among member
nations. 9 In conjunction, CARICOM members agreed to move quickly
toward customs cooperation and eventually toward customs union.20
Most notably, the declaration affirms commitment to the re-estab-
lishment of the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility by December
1990.21
16 See generally Bryan, The CARICOM and Latin American Integration Expe-
riences: Observations on Theoretical Origins, and Comparative Performance, in TEN
YEARS OF CARICOM 71 (1984). At the Summit, Prime Minister Manely stated,
"For years CARICOM conferences were talk shops because people were not into
the idea that CARICOM could do something." In fact, responding to CARICOM
inaction, St. Vincent and The Grenadines, St. Lucia and Dominica began discussion
of forming a political and economic confederation prior to the Grand Anse Dec-
laration. See Kurlansky, Spirit of Unity Sweeping Caribbean Nations Move to
Establish a Single Market, Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
11 James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989,
at 8, col. 1. The preferences for export to the EEC enjoyed under Lome III will
end in 1990. Caribbean Community Press Release, July 8, 1988 at 15. See also
Barker, CBI v. CARICOM: The Interplay Between Two International Law Instru-
ments, 11 N.C.J INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 1, 12. Fears of reductions in trade preferences
with the United States, however, have subsided as CARICOM members were pleased
with the preferences granted under the second Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI II).
Caribbean Community Press Release, May 11, 1989, at 1.
81 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12 at 2. This measure is slated for
completion by July, 1991.
19 James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989,
at 25, col. 1. See also Caribbean Community Press Release, June 25, 1988, at 1.
In late 1988 nearly all barriers to intraregional free trade were dropped. The Xinhua
General Overseas News Service, Oct. 4, 1988.
20 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1; See Schanche, 13 Caribbean
States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A. Times, July 11, 1989 at 7, col. 1.
This pledge is merely a reaffirmation of obligations arising under Article 27 of the
Treaty Annex. Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 27.
21 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1. See infra note 78 and accom-
panying text.
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
To further economic integration, members seek to establish a re-
gional capital market for the Caribbean Basin.22 The capital market
will serve to increase the movement of capital among CARICOM
nations23 and facilitate increased investment from third countries.
24
The three stock exchanges currently operating in Barbados, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Jamaica initially will form the core of the regional
market .21
The initial means of creating the regional capital market is the
cross listing of stocks on the three existing exchanges. 26 A committee
of central bankers from CARICOM states will determine the pro-
cedures for transactions in equities, bonds, debentures, and futures. 27
To smooth the transition to a regional capital market, CARICOM
leaders also agreed to formulate standardized investment incentives
to foster foreign investment in the region.
28
The Declaration also calls for CARICOM members to enact leg-
islation to give effect to the CARICOM Enterprise Regime (CER).29
The CER is designed to create special multinational companies capable
of integrating national production capabilities. 0
To further aid economic integration, members of the Grenada
Summit agreement plan to renew efforts to coordinate intraregional
transportation. 3' The agreement provides for the coordination of air
22 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1. See also Caribbean Community
Press Release, June 22, 1989, at 1. Guyana President Desomond Hoyta originally
proposed the capital market initiative. The Reuter Business Report, July 4, 1989.
23 Caribbean Community Press Release, July 8, 1989, at 1.
24 James, Caribbean Hopes High for Unified Exchange, Fin. Times (London),
July 19, 1989, at 3, col. 3. The leaders also view the unified stock exchange as a
means of stemming the flight of capital from the Caribbean Basin.
See Kurlansky, Spirit of Unity Sweeping Caribbean Nations Move to Establish
a Single Market, Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1989, at 12, col. 1.
z Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, para. 5; Caribbean Community Press
Release, July 8, 1989, at 5. Presently, each of the existing stock exchanges list its
stocks exclusively. James, Caribbean Hopes High For Unified Exchange, Fin. Times
(London), July 19, 1989, at 25, col. 1.
27 James, Caribbean Hopes High For Unified Exchange, Fin. Times (London),
July 19, 1989, at 25, col. 1.
2 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, para. 1; See Schanche, 13 Caribbean
States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A. Times, July 11, 1989 at 7, col. 1.
29 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1. See also infra note 89 and
accompanying text.
30 See Blake, Production Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CAR-
ICOM, in TEN YEARS oF CARICOM 118, 126 (1984).
31 See Schanche, 13 Caribbean States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A.
Times, July 11, 1989, at 7, col. 1. See also Caribbean Community Press Release,
June 17, 1988, at 1.
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and sea travel among CARICOM states,3 2 "including the pooling of
existing resources of air and sea carriers," 33 and also calls for free
intraregional migration through the elimination of passport and work
permit requirements.
3 4
Implementing the Grand Anse Declaration to attain a bona fide
common market in the Caribbean Basin by the 1993 deadline35 will
prove an arduous task for CARICOM leaders. In light of the failure
of past attempts to integrate the economies of the Caribbean,3 6 ac-
complishment of this ambitious goal appears questionable.
B. History and Structure of CARICOM
Because the Grenada Summit agreement will operate within the
confines of the original treaty creating CARICOM,3 7 it is necessary
to examine this organization in detail-its purposes, structure, and
related problems-before evaluating the possibility of achieving the
1993 deadline. The successful implementation of a common market
by 1993, with the dual goals of free intraregional trade and economic
integration in the Caribbean Basin, must proceed from and overcome
the troublesome history of the Caribbean Community integration
process.
The movement toward Caribbean economic and political integration
resulting in CARICOM arose from several short-lived organizations.
Preceding Caribbean independence, 3s area leaders under direction from
the British39 created the West Indies Federation which functioned
from 1959 to 1962.0 The Federation ultimately failed because of lack
of public support4' and the inability of a primarily political institution
32 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 2.
:3 Id.
4 Id. at 2-3.
11 Id. at 1.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 38-47.
31 Cf. Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1; James, Where Small Can
Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989, at 8, col. 1.
38 See generally G. LEwIs, THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN WEST INDIES 104 (1968)
(explaining the Caribbean Commonwealth independence movement).
Integration and Independence, supra note 5, at 210.
o McPetrie, The Constitution of the West Indies, 1959 Pub. L. 293, 293. The
territories involved were Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Mon-
tserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis and Anguilla, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago.
41 Integration and Independence, supra note 5, at 210. One author stated:
In 1958, Commonwealth Caribbean citizens at home and abroad heralded
the establishment of the West Indies Federation with optimism and hope
of new dignity for the region; but the short-lived euphoria yielded to self-
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to deal with "economic development on a regional basis. ' 42 The
collapse of this institution did not, however, undermine the intellectual
justification for regional economic integration. 43
Seeking to ameliorate the economic problems facing the area, 4
four Caribbean nations formed the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA) in 1968. 41 CARIFTA sought to eliminate import duties
and quantitative restrictions on goods traded among Commonwealth
Caribbean states.46 However, objections to the disparity of relative
benefits created by the operation of the agreement between the Less
Developed Countries (LDC's) and More Developed Countries (MDC's)
brought the demise of the Association and led to the creation of
CARICOM in 1973.47
Replacing the CARIFTA agreement, Caribbean nations signed the
treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market
on July 4, 1973.4 The objectives of the CARICOM treaty are three-
fold: to strengthen, coordinate, and regulate trade among member
states; to continue economic integration, with the benefits to be
doubt, intraregional recrimination and public... fears regarding political
union.
Bryan, The CARICOM and Latin American Integration Experiences: Observations
on Theoretical Origins, and Comparative Performance, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM
73 (1984). Even today, CARICOM leaders are not ready for political union. See
Schanche, 13 Caribbean States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A. Times, July
11, 1989 at 7, col. 3.
42 Bryan, The CARICOM and Latin American Integration Experiences: Obser-
vations on Theoretical Origins, and Comparative Performance, in Ten Years of
CARICOM 74 (1984).
43 Id.
" Id. at 75. These problems included rising unemployment, adverse terms of
trade, price fluctuations of Caribbean exports, and general unfavorable terms for
Caribbean products on the world market.
41 Demas, Notes on Aid Programs and Systems and the CARICOM Integration
Process, in Ten Years of CARICOM 265 n.l (1984). In 1968 the CARIFTA Agree-
ment entered into force in Antigua, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago
on May 1; in Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, on July 1;
and in Jamaica and Montserrat on August 1.
46 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association, Dec. 15, 1965,
772 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter CARIFTA Agreement).
47 See Integration and Independence, supra note 5, at 213. The LDC's became
a virtual dumping ground for the products of MDC's. CARICOM members sought
to overcome this defect by ensuring LDC's equal benefits from the Common Market.
Treaty Annex, supra note 3, at art. 3. See infra note 49.
,1 CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1; Treaty Annex, supra note 3. The treaty went
into effect on August 4, 1973. Liverpool, The Law as a Harmonizing Instrument
in the Integration Process in the Caribbean, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 238 (1983).
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equally shared by MDC and LDC member states; 49 and to elevate
the effectiveness of member states in negotiating third party trade
agreements. 50
The CARICOM Treaty itself consists of two parts. The main treaty
establishes the Caribbean Community and its organs, and contains
matters relating to the promotion of common services such as trans-
portation, health, culture, education, and travel." The Annex to the
Treaty establishes the organs of the Common Market 2 and provides
mechanisms for trade liberalization, 3 erection of a Common External
Tariff,5 4 and the coordination of economic planning and develop-
ment."
The Community institutional framework consists of three principal
organs. The first, the Heads of Government Conference, possesses
the authority to enter into agreements with states and international
organizations and "direct policies to be pursued by the Common
Market Council." 56 The second, the Common Market Council, ensures
49 CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3. The CARICOM Treaty delineates
between LDC's and MDC's. MDC states include Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trin-
idad and Tobago. Except for Bahamas, which is not given a designation, the other
states are considered LDC's.
30 CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, art 4; Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 3.
The articles cite the following objectives:
(i) the strengthening, coordination and regulation of the economic trade
relations... in order to promote their accelerated harmonious and balanced
development; (ii) the sustained expansion of continuing integration of ec-
onomic activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared... ; (iii)
the achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and ef-
fectiveness of its Member States in dealing with states, [and] groups of
states...
11 See generally CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, chs. II, III, and IV.
32 See generally Treaty Annex, supra note 3, ch. II. The Common Market Council,
consisting of one representative from each member state, is the principal organ of
the Common Market. Id. at arts. 5, 6.
13 Id. at ch. III.
14 Id. at ch. IV.
:5 Id. at ch. VI.
36 CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 7, 8. The powers and duties of the
Conference include the following:
1) The primary responsibility of the Conference shall be to determine the
policy of the Community.
2) The Conference may issue directions... as to the policy to be pursued
by the Council. . .for the achievement of the objectives of the Commu-
nity. ...
3) The Conference shall be the final authority for the conclusion of treaties
on behalf of the Community and for entering into relationships between
the Community and International Organizations and States.
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the viable operation of the Common Market and is endowed with
the duty of dispute resolution. 7 The third organ of the community,
the Common Market Secretariat, performs the administrative tasks
pursuant to the Common Market goal."
C. CARICOM Attempts at Achieving Objectives of the Treaty
The goal of promoting intraregional trade is foremost among CAR-
ICOM members and one of the primary means to this end is the
objective of free trade among CARICOM members.5 9 In 1973 when
CARICOM was created, more than ninety percent of intraregional
imports by MDC's and eighty percent of imports by LDC's were
free of trade barriers. 60 However, CARICOM members have expe-
rienced grave problems in the area of free trade since the early 1970'S.61
The crisis of the first oil shortage created severe pressure on balance
of trade payments within CARICOM states. 62 Jamaica and Guyana,
the hardest hit of the CARICOM members, responded by raising
quantitative tariffs and establishing embargoes against intraregional
4) The Conference shall take decisions for the purpose of establishing the
financial arrangements necessary for meeting the expenses of the Com-
munity....
17 Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 7(1)(a)-(e). The Council has power to ensure
"efficient operation and development of the Common Market including the settlement
of problems arising out of its functioning." Thus, while the Heads of Government
set forth the Grand Anse Declaration, the Treaty will entrust the Council with
implementation of the Declaration.
58 Id. at arts. 10, 15. The Secretariat is organized into five divisions: Trade and
Agriculture; Economics and Industry; Functional Cooperation; General Services and
Administration; and Legal.
19 See Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 21; The Caribbean Community in the
1980's 10, 63 (1981). One expert, however, disputes the original intent of the
CARICOM Treaty:
The 1973 Treaty did not attempt a fully integrated market for goods in
which capital would freely circulate and the right to establish trade and
provide services would be unfettered. Immediate objectives were the creation
of a partially integrated market for goods, and cooperation in production
and development policy.
Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation the Integration Process, in
TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 131 (1984).
60 THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1980's 21 (1981).
61 Id. at 19-26.
62 See Bourne, The International Debt Crisis and Development Strategies in the
Caribbean Community, in THE CARICOM BULLETIN 45-47 (1984). See also Reid,
The Evolving Structure of the CARICOM Trade Regime, in TIEN YEARS OF CARICOM
102, 106 (1989); CARICOM Secretariat, Patterns of Intraregional Trade in the
Caribbean Community 1973-1983, in TiE CARICOM BULLETIN 10, 12 (1984).
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imports to protect their foreign reserves. 63 Through the 1980's, suf-
fering from an egregious balance of payments problems, 64 Jamaica
devalued its currency to increase exports and the cost of imports. 65
This action prompted a chain reaction of intraregional import res-
trictions among CARICOM nations, reducing intra-CARICOM trade
by 13.307o in 1983 from the previous year. The trend continued into
1986 when intraregional trade declined a record 31.807 .67 This history
demonstrates that despite a common commitment to free intraregional
trade, 6 CARICOM members have often failed to deal effectively with
trade restrictions and contain their dynamic escalation.
In these situations, the judicial framework of the CARICOM treaty
failed. 69 Article 21 of the treaty contains a general prohibition of the
use of quantitative restrictions on goods of Common Market origin.70
Article 28 permits an exception to Article 21 for member countries
with balance of payment problems. 71 However, Article 28 of the
Treaty also provides for Council intervention designed to establish a
unified approach to contain and attenuate the effects of the restric-
tions among member states.7 2
63 Reid, The Evolving Structure of the CARICOM Trade Regime, in TEN YEARS
OF CARICOM 108 (1984).
See Baker, CBI v. CARICOM: The Interplay Between Two International Law
Instruments, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 1, 8, 9 (1986). Guyana and Jamaica,
for example, could not finance even one week of imports from international reserves
in 1983.
63 See Baker, CBI v. CARICOM: The Interplay Between Two International Law
Instruments, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 9 (1986).
6 See Baker, CBI v. CARICOM: The Interplay Between Two International Law
Instruments, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. at 8, 9 (1986). The decline in trade
was the result of a chain reaction of protectionism that started with Jamaica, followed
by Trinidad and Tobago, and later by Barbados. Jamaica's multiple exchange rate
contributed to the problem. Id. See also Unconventional Exchange Control Tech-
niques: An Evaluation of Foreign Exchange Auction System in Jamaica, 14 INT'L
Bus. L. 283, 283 (1986).
67 In 1987, intraregional trade increased nearly eight percent over the preceding
year, ending a five year trend of decline. The Xinhua General Overseas News Service,
Oct. 19, 1988. See generally Patterns of Intraregional Trade in the Caribbean
Community 1973-1983, Ti CARICOM BULLETIN 10-12 (1984).
, See Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 21.
69 Cf. Reid, The Evolving Structure of the CARICOM Trade Regime, in TEN
YEARS OF CARICOM 102-110 (1984).
70 Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 21.
71 Id. at art. 21, 28(1). Article 28(1) states that "Notwithstanding Article 21...a
member state may... introduce... restrictions... [to safeguard] its balance of pay-
ments."
72 Id. at art. 28(2).This section provides:
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Although frequently resorting to restrictions, member states have
rarely evoked the Article 28 exemption or its attenuation procedures. 73
For example, Jamaica and Guyana have imposed restrictions on
CARICOM imports but only Jamaica formally evoked the provisions
of Article 28. Nor did CARICOM members evoke the Treaty me-
chanisms to deal constructively with the restrictions.7 4 Summarizing
the failures in this respect, a group of experts stated that the "[tireaty
was.. .honored more in breach than in the observance," yet the
community made no attempt "to invoke the dispute settlement ma-
chinery set up by the members themselves.... ,,7
To help alleviate the balance of payments crisis, 76 instability in
intraregional exchange rates, 77 and the resulting loss in intra-CARI-
The Council shall examine the situation and keep it under review and may
at any time by majority vote make recommendations designed to moderate
any damaging effect of these restrictions. If the balance of payments dif-
ficulties persist for more than 18 months, . . the Council shall. . ., by
majority vote, devise special measures to attenuate... the effect of such
measures.
71 Reid, The Evolving Structure of the CARICOM Trade Regime, in TEN YEARS
OF CARICOM 110, 113 (1983).
71 See Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation in the Integration
Process, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 131, 131 (1984). Emtage States:
The practical threat to the Common Market's existing range of benefits
derives from the increasingly routine use of measures which the original
Treaty clearly envisaged as exceptional and to be reserved for times of
genuine emergency.
See also, Reid, The Evolving Structure of the CARICOM Trade Regime, in TEN
YEARS OF CARICOM 113 (1984).
71 Liverpool, The Law as a Harmonizing Instrument in the Integration Process
in the Caribbean, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 245-46 (1984).
76 See generally Bourne, The International Debt Crisis and Development Strategy
in the Caribbean Community, in TBE CARICOM BULLETiN 45-48 (1984). The external
debt as a percentage of GNP for MDC's within Caricom for 1977 was 18.6 for
Bahamas, 11.2 for Barbados, 97.5 for Guyana, 41.5 for Jamaica, and 11.5 for
Trinidad & Tobago. The debt crisis did not recess thereafter. The public external
debt as a percentage of GNP for CARICOM MDC's in 1982 was as follows: Bahamas
14.2; Barbados 20.7; Guyana 126.5; Jamaica 49.9; Trinidad and Tobago 8.9. Trinidad
and Tobago's relatively low debt obligations stem from its status as a net petroleum
exporter. For the CARICOM LCD's, the external debt as a percentage of GNP for
1981 was as follows: Antigua & Barbuda 27.9; Dominica 28.8; Grenada 17.7;
Montserrat 10.0; St. Kitts 21.0; St. Lucia 13.7; St. Vincent 23.1. See also supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
77 See Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation in the Integration
Process, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 131, 136 (1984). Guyana has devalued its
currency once and Jamaica twice. Exchange rate instability has been somewhat
ameliorated since all CARICOM states now use the U.S. dollar as an intervention
currency. Id. See also CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, art. 43. "Exchange rate
stability as between... [CARICOM members] is necessary to promote the smooth
functioning of the Common Market. .. ."
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COM trade,78 members began operation of the Multilateral Clearing
Facility (Facility) in 1977.79 This clearing house provided for the
multilateral settlement of accounts on credit by which a state's trade
payments were determined "by its balance in relation to the system
as a whole." ' 0 The Facility thus eased the erratic cash flow pressures
placed on foreign reserves of member states."1
The Facility initially operated successfully but began to falter in
the early 1980's. Reacting to trade restrictions imposed by Jamaica
and Guyana, member states increased the credit limit to U.S. $100
million to maintain the level of intraregional trade.8 2 Guyana, how-
ever, was unable to settle its obligations as they fell due 3 and the
facility closed in 1983 when it reached its credit limit.8 4 Infusion of
credit from third countries was not forthcoming and CARICOM
nations soon lost a vital link in the trade regime.85 Thus, because of
inability to resolve the external debt crisis and utilization of protec-
tionist measures, the CARICOM objective of free intraregional trade
never quite came to fruition.
Another objective of the CARICOM treaty is the coordination and
integration of economic development.8 6 Economic integration has sev-
eral rationales. First, economic integration serves to reduce inefficient
78 See Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation in the Integration
Process, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 131, 133 (1984). As Emtage stated:
As a result of the deteriorating regional economic situation and its effects
on the balance of payments position of several members, it became evident
by late 1975 that unless arrangements could be devised to maintain in-
traregional trade flows, import restriction would be imposed in order to
protect dwindling foreign reserves, with quite damaging results for CAR-
ICOM.
,9 Id.
Q Id. at 133, 134. For example, "[a] bilateral surplus with one country [could]
be used to offset a bilateral deficit with another, leaving the country with a single
credit balance or a debit balance with the facility."
11 Id. at 133.
82 Id. at 134.
83 The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, July 5, 1986. Guyana owed 60
million U.S. dollars to Barbados alone.
84 Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation in the Integration Process,
in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 131, 134 (1984).
85 Id. at 135. In July 1987, CARICOM members initiated the re-opening of the
CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility. The 75 million dollar credit facility will
be funded by CARICOM countries as well as international financing agencies. See
The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, July 28, 1987; The Caribbean Com-
munity Press Release, June 22, 1989, at 1.
86 See CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 46, 47, 49.
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duplication of goods.8 7 It also eliminates the constraints imposed by
national market size and resource limitations and promotes economies
of large scale production."' In addition, integration furthers the broader
goal of intraregional trade promotion since it can lead to import
substitution.8 9 Despite the benefits, however, CARICOM members
have done little to further this treaty objective.9
Integrating factors of production of goods and services among
CARICOM members is a principal means of achieving the economic
integration objective. 9' Although many viable production integration
proposals have been made,92 CARICOM members have been reluctant
to implement these proposals. Problems over allocation of benefits
among participant members and more explicitly political considera-
tions were factors forestalling execution of such plans. 93
Pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, 94 in 1976 the Ministers
of Finance approved the establishment of the CARICOM Enterprise
87 THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1980's 63 (1981). In this context, duplication
means the uneconomic presence of two similar industries within two or more CAR-
ICOM states when one industry would prove more efficient.
11 CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 46. The CARICOM treaty envisions
economic integration to achieve:
(a) the greater utilization of the raw materials of the Common Market; (b)
the creation of production linkages both within and between the national
economies of the Common Market; (c) to minimize product differentiation
and achieve economies of large scale production; (d) the encouragement of
greater efficiency in industrial production.
See also Blake, Production Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CAR-
ICOM, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 122, 123 (1984).
89 See Reid, The Evolving Structure of the CARICOM Trade Regime, in TEN
YEARS OF CARICOM 103 (1984). Import substitution is simply the substitution of
regionally produced goods for imported goods. "The emphasis on import substitution
rather than export creation was predicated on the need to use the integration process
to make the economies.. .less dependent on the rest of the world. ... " Id. Import
substitution also is a means of conserving scarce foreign exchange. Cf. Conesa,
Decision-Making in the Latin American Integration Experience, in TEN YEARS OF
CARICOM 237 (1984).
90 THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1980's 109 (1981). Cf. Blake, Production
Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CARICOM, in TEN YEARS OF
CARICOM 122 (1984).
91 Id.
92 See generally Blake, Production Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects
in CARICOM, in TEN YEARS oF CARICOM 118, 125-127 (1984). A primary example
is the aluminum smelter projects which were to be based on the marriage of alumina
from Jamaica and Guyana and energy supplies, namely natural gas, of other CAR-
ICOM nations. Other suggested production opportunities have included wood based
products such as plywood and prefabricated houses, ceramic products, and fish
processing.
93 Id.
94 See generally, Treaty Annex, supra note 3, arts. 45-50.
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Regime (CER), advancing the Treaty objective of economic integra-
tion.95 The CER provided for the establishment of "specially organ-
ized multinational companies to undertake activities relating to
agricultural, industrial and mineral development." Although all CAR-
ICOM members approved the agreement establishing the CER, it was
signed by ten and ratified by only one member. 96 The failure of
CARICOM members to implement the CARICOM Enterprise Regime
manifests most strikingly the lack of progress in production integra-
tion.
Four institutional and market factors have contributed to the prob-
lems of production integration in the effort to integrate the economies
of CARICOM states. First has been the problem of market mobility,
particularly in the area of the movement of capital resources. Al-
though Article 37 calls upon CARICOM leaders to initiate policies
to facilitate capital movement, 97 nothing has been done to fulfill this
Treaty obligation.9" A second impediment to production integration
has been the resistance to the Treaty obligation99 of harmonizing
company law' °° among member states.' 0' Harmony among member
11 See Blake, Production Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CAR-
ICOM, in TEN YEARs OF CARICOM 126 (1984).
" Id. Barbados was the only member to ratify the agreement. Other members
were not willing to give up control of resources at the national level.
97 Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 37. See Blake, Production Integration: Scope,
Limitations and Prospects in CARICOM, in TEN YEARs OF CARICOM 125 (1983).
With respect to services:
each Member State agrees as far as practicable to extend to persons belonging
to other Member States preferential treatment over persons belonging to
states outside the Common Market....
Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art 36.
91 Caribbean Community Press Release, June 22, 1989, at 2. See Blake, Production
Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CARICOM, in TEN YEARS OF
CARICOM 118, 126 (1984). Member states have desired weak links with respect to
the movement of capital within the Common Market to ensure continued control
at the national level over resource movements.
99 Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 42.
,00 THE REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON THE HARMONIZATION OF COMPANY
LAW 3 (1979). "Harmony can be said to be an exercise which aims at making
[changes] to the existing laws of Member States to a point where the operation of
those laws... beneficially affect the . . .operation of the Common Market."
,0, See Liverpool, The Law as a Harmonizing Instrument in the Integration Process
in the Caribbean, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 243 (1984). A standing committee
produced a draft bill for harmonization of company law after nearly 10 years of
negotiation. As of 1984, only Barbados had passed legislation along the lines of the
provisions of the draft bill.
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states in this area is crucial to initiating cost effective multilateral
business ventures within the Caribbean basin.'0 2
A third factor constricting regional production integration is the
disposition of the Treaty respecting intraregional migration. Since the
Treaty fails to provide for the free movement of labor within the
CARICOM states,' 3 the efficient movement of labor across national
borders often has been hindered. Finally, CARICOM members have
resisted procedures to integrate production on a regional scale for
fear of relinquishing local control of national resources.' °4 Thus, the
goals of production integration as well as free intraregional trade
have been frustrated even as CARICOM states have continued efforts
to fulfill these dual objectives of the Treaty.
D. Outlook for 1993
CARICOM members will attempt to reach the collective goal of
a true Common Market for 1993 against the historical backdrop of
mixed results in free trade and production integration. Clearly, the
institutional and economic difficulties previously encountered in the
implementation of the objectives of the CARICOM treaty must be
overcome. The realization of the goal of 1993 will depend on how
well the Grand Anse Declaration can provide mechanisms to remedy
the problems of the past.
One promising factor suggesting an accelerated pace toward a
common market by 1993 is the perception among CARICOM mem-
bers that outside forces are compelling Caribbean nations to form a
closer economic union. 5 The single market arrangement between the
102 THE REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON THE HARMONY OF COMPANY LAW 4
(1979). A uniform system of law would: 1) reduce operational and administrative
costs of business; 2) diminish artificial distortions of the market; and 3) promote
regional economic independence. Id. See also James, Caribbean Hopes High For
Unified Exchange, Fin. Times (London), July 19, 1989, at 25, col. 1; Pollard,
Copyright Protection in the Caribbean Community, in THE CARICOM BULLETIN
20, 21 (1985) (stating the importance of copyright law harmonization to economic
integration).
,03 Blake, Production Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CARICOM,
in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 126 (1984). The Treaty states that it does not impose
any obligation on member states regarding movement of persons within CARICOM
states. Treaty Annex, supra note 3, at art. 38.
,04 Cf. Blake, Production Integration: Scope, Limitations and Prospects in CAR-
ICOM, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 126 (1984).
103 James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989,
at 8, col. 1. Indeed, an "external shock" may be essential for successful economic
integration. Cf. Conesa, Decision Making in the Latin American Integration Ex-
perience, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 237 (1984).
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United States and Canada, the possibility of Pacific Rim economic
unification, and the fertile ground of Eastern Europe as a location
for western investors' °6 have raised the question of whether the Car-
ibbean integration movement will be "marginalized and pushed
aside. "107
More importantly, CARICOM leaders are buttressing themselves
for the harmful side effects they anticipate when European trade
barriers go down in 1992.10 s However, the threat of a united Europe
may prove more apparent than real. Exports to European Economic
Community (EEC) countries have declined from 26.8%Vo of all CAR-
ICOM exports in 1968 to 10%Vo in 1983.' °9 Moreover, the preferences
granted CARICOM member exports to the EEC in the Lom6 Con-
ventions have not had any significant effect on Caribbean exports
to the EEC."10
If the new Lom6 agreement"' continues the preferences granted
under past agreements, the external stimulus for economic unification
may be extinguished." 2 Similarly, if large quantities of traditionally
exempted CARICOM exports to the EEC continue," 3 CARICOM
-o6 See James, Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1,
1989, at 8, col. 1. See also Kurlansky, Spirit of Unity Sweeping Caribbean Nations
Move to Establish a Single Market, Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
101 Kurlansky, Spirit of Unity Sweeping Caribbean Nations Move to Establish a
Single Market, L.A. Times, July 11, 1989, at 7, col. 1. The Prime.Minister of
Dominica expressed:
[W]e are looking at what is happening... and realizing that we are foolish
to think that we as small countries can go along on one's own when even
large countries are realizing they must get together much closer.
oS Schanche, 13 Caribbean States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A. Times,
July 11, 1989 at 7, col. 1. Almost half of the length of the Summit concerned trade
relations with the EEC. Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1989, at 3, col. 3. As one minister
noted: "[T]he formation of a single market in Europe in 1992 should provide... an
inescapable point to try to settle practical questions for our own market." James,
Where Small Can Be Bountiful, Fin. Times (London), Aug. 1, 1989.
109 Gonzales, Main Issues in the Dynamics of Caribbean/EEC Cooperation, in
THE CARICOM BULLETIN 37, 41 (1983).
110 Id. at 42. The large increase in exports of refined oil and alumina to the EEC
in the 1980's, which do not enjoy preference under the Lom6 Conventions, have
diminished the importance of trade preferences granted by the EEC. Id. at 40.
- Caribbean Community Press Release, Feb. 9, 1989, at 1. Trade preferences
granted CARICOM members under Lom III will end in 1990. Negotiations have
been underway in Brussels, Belgium to continue the preferences.
"I See Caribbean Community Press Release, June 26, 1989, at 1. Leaders of the
EEC have assured CARICOM members that trade preferences will not be diminished
after trade barriers are abolished within the EEC in 1992.
" See, e.g., supra note 110.
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members may realize that the possibility of diminished preferences
resulting from a united Europe may have relatively little effect on
CARICOM exports as a whole. Thus, any external impetus for ac-
celerated economic integration may depend upon the continued un-
folding of CARICOM-EEC relations.
For the present, however, self-interested concern over global changes,
whether objectively or subjectively perceived, may cause CARICOM
leaders to direct renewed efforts toward implementing free trade and
production integration by 1993.
External factors aside, the establishment of free trade among CAR-
ICOM members may well prove an onerous task, as execution of
this objective within the structure of the CARICOM Treaty may be
problematic. Although the Grand Anse Declaration calls for the
elimination of quantitative and qualitative restrictions, 1 4 Article 28
of the Treaty gives member states the right to exempt goods from
free trade treatment when faced with balance of payment problems." 5
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 28 empower the Common Market
Council to "devise special procedures to attenuate or compensate"
for the effect of quantitative restrictions. Offsetting this exemption
right, however, is the Article 28 attenuation provision never evoked
by CARICOM members." 6
This attenuation provision is important to establishing free trade
because it furnishes a unified means of responding to protectionism.
It may thus prove indispensable in initial stages of protectionism to
avoid dynamic escalation of trade restrictions as individual members,
in ad hoc fashion, seek to attenuate the effects of trade restrictions.
Consequently, further prompt use of this unified approach by the
Common Market Council may ensure smooth transition to free trade
and prevent the chain reaction of protectionism similar to that which
restricted intraregional trade in the 1980's."17 Unfortunately, CARI-
COM members make no commitment in the Declaration to renewing
efforts to utilize this potentially beneficial mechanism nor to provide
for new dispute settlement procedures." '
114 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 2. See Schanche, 13 Caribbean
States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A. Times, July 11, 1989, at 7, col. 1;
Caribbean Press Release, July 8, 1989, at 1-2.
"I Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 28. K
116 Id. at art. 28, para. 2, 3. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
"S CARICOM members have made progress in establishing a Caribbean Court of
Appeal. The precise nature of the court is not certain. Caribbean Community Press
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The Article 28 mechanism, however, merely suggests the use of
counter-protection against the state resorting to the exemption. The
mechanism concentrates attention on compensating for the effects
of restrictions on member states rather than on the means by which
to alleviate the need to resort to the Article 28 exemption. Thus,
CARICOM members must address regional balance of payment
problems-the cause for resorting to qualitative restrictions and the
Article 28 exemption in the past. l" 9
The revitalization of the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility,
invested with new funds, directly confronts this problem. 120 The
Facility has the potential to offset or perhaps prevent the recurrence
of debt crises and monetary instability which plagued intra-CAR-
ICOM trade in the past' 2' by providing a mechanism to "minimize
seasonal cash flow problems" and conserve foreign exchange through
multilateral settlement of accounts. 22
To avoid the series of events leading to the Facility's collapse in
1983,123 changes in prior operations of the Facility must occur.
CARICOM members could preserve the Facility's liquidity and lon-
gevity by strictly conditioning further provisional credit upon set-
tlement of existing debts. 24 In addition, the Facility could arrange
for temporary infusion of credit from industrialized nations and
international economic organizations if liquidity of the Facility is
threatened due to increases in regional import prices. 125 These issues
aside, the revitalization of the Facility will smooth the transition to
Release, July 8, 1989, at 3. The history of the movement to create the court suggests
and adjudicative role of matters arising under the Treaty. Cf. Liverpool, The Law
as a Harmonizing Instrument in the Integration Process in the Caribbean, in TEN
YEARS OF CARICOM 238, 245 (1984).
"I Supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
120 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1. See The Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, July 28, 1987; supra note 85.
121 See supra notes 62, 76 and accompanying text.
122 Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation in the Integration Process,
in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 131, 133 (1984).
23 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
124 Emtage, Notes on the Role of Financial Cooperation in the Integration Process,
in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM, 134 (1984). "Common sense indicates that a payment
mechanism such as the [Facility] cannot survive if one of its participants is a persistent
debtor and unable to settle any part of its indebtedness." Emtage suggests estab-
lishment of board similar to the European Payments Union Managing Board as a
means of dealing with persistent debtor nations.
121 Increase in petroleum prices, for example, caused much of the debt crisis in
CARICOM states. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. It should be noted
that the fall of staple export prices may also lead to the taxing of the Facility.
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realization of the free trade goal affirmed in the Grand Anse Dec-
laration. 126
Renewed utilization of Article 28 procedures and the successful
operation of the Facility will not, however, ensure elimination of
trade barriers. Article 28 procedures are designed only to attenuate
and contain such restrictions while the Facility will merely alleviate
problems associated with short term settlements of debts. Hence,
neither Article 28 nor the Facility addresses the underlying macro-
economic impetus for trade restrictions.
Consequently, the preconditions of stable petroleum and other
commodity prices 127 and the continued recovery of the international
economy must exist1 28 for CARICOM members to avoid further
balance of payment problems and the resulting imposition of res-
trictions to protect foreign reserves. 29 These factors are basically
outside the control of CARICOM members'3° and must be considered
the "wild cards" of successful implementation of free trade.',
Thus, while the Declaration essentially sets forth a timetable of
objectives leading to an intraregional free trade regime,3 2 it does
not provide a framework for creating the environment necessary to
bring about that objective or the perpetuation of the regime once
free intraregional trade has been attained. It is clear that in order
to realize the goal of free trade in 1993 and beyond, CARICOM
members (1) must make effective use of available dispute settlement
mechanisms to curtail protectionist measures, (2) constructively util-
ize the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility, and (3) hope and
work for the continued vitality of the international economic re-
covery and stabilized commodity prices.
126 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 2.
127 Id.
121 Cf. Reid, The Evolving Structure of CARICOM Trade Regime, in TEN YEARS
OF CARICOM 106 (1984).
,29 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. The current outlook is promising
with respect to expenditures for oil imports. In 1988 expenditures for petroleum
imports propped 18.7% of total intraregional imports over the preceding year.
Caribbean Community Press Release, June 14, 1989, at 1.
130 See Caribbean Community Press Release, May 8, 1987, at 13.
3, This is not to say CARICOM members have no control over petroleum prices.
Of course, the CARICOM market is too small to have more than a negligible impact
on world oil prices. CARICOM members can, however, reduce their reliance on oil
imports and accordingly preserve foreign reserves. See TrE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
IN THE 1980's 53-56 (1981). Alternatively, CARICOM states can also eliminate their
reliance on relatively few staple exports to lessen the impact of the balance of
payments problems which often arise when staple exports fluctuate in price.
,32 See supra note 13.
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With respect to production integration, the establishment of a
regional capital market through the union of regional stock markets'33
will greatly increase the ability of CARICOM members to mobilize
capital to facilitate production integration. 134 Although internal prob-
lems will almost certainly arise,1 5 the regional stock exchange will
provide a facility for the removal of the primary impediment to
production integration-the lack of capital mobility and availabi-
lity-within the region. 3 6 Moreover, renewed commitment to de-
velopment of the CARICOM Enterprise Regime at the Heads of
Government Conference 3 7 holds promise for renewed interest in
joint-ventures in the region.' These two initiatives indicate a re-
laxation of national policies directed toward local control of re-
sources-policies which constricted production integration in the
past. 1
39
The elimination of passport and work permit requirements' ° for
intraregional travel will increase labor movement within the region. 14
Commitment to the free movement of labor is a particularly sig-
nificant and positive departure from the Treaty, which does not
impose any obligation on member states regarding movement of
persons.' 42 This initiative is aided by commitment to regional air
and sea transportation, including "the pooling of resources by ex-
isting air and sea carriers.' '1 43 Thus, the free movement of capital
I Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1.
134 See Caribbean Community Press Release, June 22, 1989, at 1.
"I See James, Caribbean Hopes High for Unified Exchange, Fin. Times (London),
Aug. 1, 1989, at 8, col. 1. James identifies these impediments to establishing a
regional capital market as (1) the possibility of currency devaluations, (2) disparity
in company laws among CARICOM members, (3) lack of double taxation agreements,
and (4) installation of telecommunication networks.
136 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. The regional exchange will also
fulfill Treaty obligations under Article 37 calling for programs to enhance capital
movement within the area. CARICOM Treaty, supra note 1, art. 37.
13 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 1.
'3, The CARICOM Enterprise Regime finally began preliminary operations in April
of 1989, supported by Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis,
Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and The Grenadines. See Caribbean Community Press
Release, April 24, 1989, at 1.
13 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
140 Schanche, 13 Caribbean States OK Proposal for Economic Union, L.A. Times,
July 11, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
14 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 2, 3.
,,2 Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 38.
"43 Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 12, at 2. East Caribbean nations have
initiated negotiations with the United Kingdom to establish a single multinational
air service. See Caribbean Community Press Release, July 8, 1989 at 6; Caribbean
Community Press Release, June 2, 1989, at 1.
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and labor and the opposition to joint production activities,," which
provided the greatest obstacles to production integration in the past,
may well be remedied. The Grand Anse Declaration calls forth
optimism for successful production integration.
One impediment to production integration, company law har-
monization, remains unaddressed in the Grand Anse Declaration. 45
Failure to effect measures in this direction will likely forestall the
successful realization of both the regional stock market' 46 and ad-
vancement in production integration. CARICOM members could
easily fulfill the treaty obligation of law harmonization' 47 and ease
transition to production integration by passing legislation consistent
with the standing committee's draft bill for harmonizing national
laws. 148
II. CONCLUSION
The prognosis for a bona fide common market by 1993 is mixed.
The goal of free trade is still inhibited by the failure to use dispute
mechanisms within the CARICOM Treaty and the unpredictable
nature of the international economic climate. On the other hand,
measures taken to further production integration in the region,
including the creation of a regional stock market and implementation
of the CARICOM Enterprise Regime, appear to be viable means
of attaining the production integration objective by 1993. The success
of the Grenada Summit agreement rests primarily on whether CAR-
ICOM leaders can dispel the historical difficulties left unaddressed
by the new agreement.
No one can foretell how long the external impetus for an accel-
erated pace toward integration will focus the attention of CARICOM
leaders toward 1993. The Grand Anse Declaration advances the
original goals of CARICOM, overcomes many of its internal and
external weaknesses, and establishes a dateline for a Common Mar-
ket. The broad goal of Caribbean economic integration will, how-
ever, not succeed or fail by 1993; it is a process. And it is this
' See supra notes 97-98, 103-04 and accompanying text.
14 James, Caribbean Hopes High for United Exchange, Fin. Times (London),
July 19, 1989, at 25, col. 1.
146 Id.
147 Treaty Annex, supra note 3, art. 42.
"I See Liverpool, The Law as a Harmonizing Instrument in the Integration Process
in the Caribbean, in TEN YEARS OF CARICOM 243 (1984). See also supra note 102.
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notion which observers must hold in mind as CARICOM members
press toward the 1993 deadline.
C. Ray Miskelley

